19 April 2018
15.00 - 17.00
Aula di Antica
Palazzo Nuovo (Piano II)
via Sant'Ottavio 20, Torino
Self-reference vs. ungroundedness
Abstract. Self-reference is apparently crucial in the whole matter of paradoxes and represents a standard way of rephrasing most paradoxical arguments in philosophy and logic. So it may be of interest to inquire to what extent self-reference is essential or it can be eliminated in favor of alternative routes. Historically, we know that there are paradoxes arising from unfoundedness or ungroundedness, and it has been remarked that using infinite descending sequences, one can also obtain a semantical contradiction without self-reference. In this talk, we first reconsider the paradoxes of Burali-Forti and Mirimanoff against Russell-Zermelo. We then deal with Yablo's paradox as a case-study for the main issue, in the light of recent contributions. The recent debate shows that self-reference deserves to be further investigated and is not so well-understood.
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