Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell'Educazione

Subjective probability has been a core notion in epistemology for many years. Until not long ago, when epistemologists used this concept, they implicitly (or explicitly) took it to be a typed concept. More recently, for instance in the context of versions of van Fraassen’s reflection principle, epistemologists have informally or half-formally made use of the concept of typefree or reflexive subjective probability. Since probability 1 is to some extent analogous to typefree truth, there is a worry that reflexive subjective probability is subject to liar-like paradoxes. In my talk, I investigate to what extent this worry is justified. Moreover, I will concentrate on the task of articulating and exploring a minimal system of reflexive subjective probability that is safe and sound, and that can be used as common ground in epistemological discussions in which typefree subjective probability plays a role. (Based on joint work with Cezary Cieslinski and Hannes Leitgeb).