Christian LIST (London School of Economics) Free will in a physical world - Torino, 30 novembre 2018
Pubblicato: Martedì 27 novembre 2018
LLC Lecture
30 November 2018
Sala Lauree della Scuola di Scienze Umanistiche
Palazzo Nuovo (ground floor)
via Sant'Ottavio 20, Torino
Sala Lauree della Scuola di Scienze Umanistiche
Palazzo Nuovo (ground floor)
via Sant'Ottavio 20, Torino
Christian LIST
(London School of Economics)
(London School of Economics)
Free will in a physical world
(https://www.llc.unito.it/eventi/llc-lecture-2018-christian-list)
Abstract. It has become increasingly common — especially in popular-science media — to suggest that free will is an illusion. Typically, people argue: free will requires property P, where P might be one or several of the following: intentional agency, alternative possibilities, or mental causation. But then they claim that physics, or some other fundamental science, shows that there is no such thing as P; P is a relic of a folk-psychological way of thinking. And so, it seems, there is no free will. I will argue that this line of reasoning is mistaken. It may well be true that there is no such thing as property P at the fundamental physical level. But this does not imply that there is no free will. Free will, I suggest, is a higher-level phenomenon. It emerges from physical phenomena but is not best understood in physical terms. If we are looking for free will and its prerequisites at the physical level, we are looking in the wrong place.
Abstract. It has become increasingly common — especially in popular-science media — to suggest that free will is an illusion. Typically, people argue: free will requires property P, where P might be one or several of the following: intentional agency, alternative possibilities, or mental causation. But then they claim that physics, or some other fundamental science, shows that there is no such thing as P; P is a relic of a folk-psychological way of thinking. And so, it seems, there is no free will. I will argue that this line of reasoning is mistaken. It may well be true that there is no such thing as property P at the fundamental physical level. But this does not imply that there is no free will. Free will, I suggest, is a higher-level phenomenon. It emerges from physical phenomena but is not best understood in physical terms. If we are looking for free will and its prerequisites at the physical level, we are looking in the wrong place.
Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition (LLC)
University of Turin